In this article, the author offers a detailed analysis of the history of the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP), a political organization whose foundation date itself has been thus far ambiguous, relying mainly on the party's own documents. The relationships between the Brunei Uprising and the armed struggle in Sarawak are also referred to. Though the Brunei Uprising of 1962 waged by the Partai Rakyat Brunei (People's Party of Brunei) was soon followed by armed struggle in Sarawak, their relations have so far not been adequately analyzed. The author also examines the decisive roles played by Wen Ming Chyuan, Chairman of the NKCP, and the People's Republic of China, which supported the NKCP for the entire period following its inauguration.
INTRODUCTION
A PRELIMINARY study of the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP, hereafter referred to as "the Party"), an illegal leftist political party based in Sarawak, was published by this author in 2000 (Hara 2000) . However, the study did not rely on the official documents of the Party itself, but instead relied mainly on information provided by third parties such as the Renmin ribao of China and the Zhen xian bao, the newspaper that was the weekly organ of the now defunct Barisan Sosialis of Singapore. Though these were closely connected with the NKCP, many problems still remained unresolved. In this study the author attempts to construct a more precise party history relying mainly on the party's own information and documents provided by former members during the author's visit to Sibu in August 2001.
--------------------------
This paper is an outcome of research funded by the Pache Research Subsidy I-A of Nanzan University for the academic year 2000.
1 These include two volumes of Friendship Series Editorial Committee (2000a Committee ( , 2000b , Chua (2000) , and several mimeographed Party documents shown in the reference lists. Chua's book relies mainly on the Party's documents and, as such, is reliable enough. Friendship Series Editorial Committee (2002) and Luo et al. (2003) became available later. Sibu, located alongside the Rejang River, is the largest city of the Third Division of Sarawak. Chinese youths of this city as well as of Kuching, the state capital of Sarawak, provided the main force of the communist guerrillas. The former guerrilla members, who resumed normal social life after concluding the peace treaty in 1990, formed the Sibu Friendship Association. Some of them are now publishing their memoirs. This paper, which brings the relations between the NKCP and China into focus, consists of the following sections: I. Prehistory of the NKCP; II. Links between the Brunei Uprising of December 1962 and the NKCP; III. Foundation and development of the NKCP; IV. Role of the chairman, Wen Ming Chyuan; and V. Relations between the NKCP and China.
I. PREHISTORY OF THE NKCP
It has always been believed that the nascent communist organization of Sarawak emerged in 1941 (Tian 1990, p. 12 ; also see Table I ).
2 The Anti-Fascist League that was formed soon after Japan occupied Sarawak is said to have been renamed in 1942 as the Sarawak National Liberation League (SNLL).
3 However, the SNLL is not mentioned in the party's own documentation. The Progressive Overseas Chinese Youth Society (POCYS) was formed in the late 1940s by those who returned from Singapore. They had joined the Singapore POCYS during their stay there. Their standpoint was to support the local revolution as sojourners believing themselves to be patriots of China (NKNLP 1983, p. 1) . Locally oriented Chinese youths organized the Sarawak New Democratic Youth League (SNDYL) in October 1951 (Table II) . But, because of mistakes committed by the extremists' leadership, their movement lost popular support. The main leaders left Sarawak for China via Indonesia and as a result, the SNDYL was dissolved at the end of 1952 (NKNLP 1983, pp. 2-3) . The Sarawak Liberation League (SLL) was formed under the guidance of the Malayan Anti-British League, a united front of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), on March 20, 1954 (NKNLP 1983 . Prior to the official inauguration of the NKCP of 1971, "the Party" for relevant members, meant the SLL. 4 That is why in August 1964, the Declaration of Foundation of the North Kalimantan National Liberation League (NKNLL) stated that it was founded under the guidance of the NKCP (NKNLL 1964, p. 3) . 5 The top foundation leaders of the SLL were Wen Ming Chyuan, Teo Yong Jin, who later escaped to Indonesia to avoid arrest, and Qiu Liben, who is now a prominent scholar in China. 6 2 Refer to Table I for this whole section. 3 See Deng et al. (1989, p. 24) . 4 Interview with Wong Lieng Kui on August 27, 2001 . With regard to the official inauguration of the NKCP, see Section III. 5 Chua Chung Toi says that the NKNLL was formed under the guidance of the SLL (Chua 2000, p. 68) . 6 Letter from Wong Lieng Kui to Hara dated July 22, 2003. Chua Chung Toi refers to Bong Kee Chok, Lam Wah Kwai, and Wong Fuk Ing (wife of Wen) , all of whom were later to lead the NKCP, also as some of the founder leaders (Chua 2000, p. 14) . Wong does not agree with Chua's interpretation in respect of these three names.
As for Wong Fuk Ing, Chin Ung-Ho states that she was born in China (Chin 1997, p. 69) . However, Deng Lun Qi states that both of the Wens and the Bongs were born in Sarawak (Deng 1989, p. 151) . Chua (2000, pp.136-40) . Other sources are as follows: (1) North Kalimantan National Liberation Publisher (1983, p. 3);
(2) Deng, Lun Qi et al. (1989, p. 178 Anonymous (1988, p.6 ); (10) Anonymous (1988, p. 18) . According to the official annoncement, however, the MOU was signed on October 20, 1973; (11) Mohd. Reduan (1993, p. 192) ; (12) Feb. 7, 1971 , Oct. 3, 1971 ; and (7) Malaysia (1972, p. 26) . a Relies on the various documents of the NKCP.
In 1955 the Sarawak Advanced Youths' Association (SAYA), an organization affiliated to the SLL, was formed (Chua 2000, p. 136; letter from Wong Lieng Kui dated July 22, 2003) . Ang Chu Ting, who was to lead the NKCP after Bong Kee Chok's departure in 1973, was dispatched by the SLL to Sibu in 1957 to establish SAYA's nucleus in the Third Division (Chua 2000, p. 16) . 7 The NKNLL was formed in 1964, in other words during the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Its foundation was coincident with the establishment of the Jakarta branch of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL), this being the MCP's united front organization (Chua 2000, p. 61 (Porritt 2004, pp. 282-83, 291) . After Ang was dispatched by the SLL to Sibu, the communist organization there was revived and enlarged (Chua 2000, p. 16). joint efforts at cooperation between the SLL and the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), whose main leaders sought asylum in Indonesia after an aborted uprising there. Membership of the SLL and SAYA peaked at three thousand, while the NKNLL and the Sarawak Farmers' Association (SFA) 8 had more than thirty thousand members respectively and the trade unions nearly ten thousand (NKNLP 1983, pp. 6, 10-11) .
As regards the military organizations under the NKCP, the Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force (SPGF) led by Bong, Yang Chu Chung, and Wen Ming Chyuan was formed on March 30, 1964 at Gunung Asuansang 9 in West Kalimantan with an assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Indonesian government (Anonymous 1988, pp. 3-4; letter from Wong). The North Kalimantan People's Army (NKPA) was formed by Bong near the Sungai Melawi, West Kalimantan, with the assistance of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) on October 26, 1965 (Anonymous 1988 . While the SPGF, whose commander was Yang, was to operate in the western territory of Sarawak, the NKPA, commanded first by Lam Wah Kwai and then by Bong, was active in eastern Sarawak. Besides the SLL, the SAYA and the NKPA were the main, fundamental elements of the NKCP (Chua 2000, pp. 53, 56, 66) .
II. LINKS BETWEEN THE BRUNEI UPRISING OF DECEMBER 1962 AND THE NKCP
The PRB, which was formed on January 22, 1956, opposed the Malaysia plan as proposed by Malayan Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman in May 1961. Instead, it insisted on the establishment of an independent state to be called the Unitary States of Northern Borneo (Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara, NKKU, consisting of Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah) as a first step before negotiating with the Malayan government to form the state of Malaysia. When Brunei's first-ever general election for District Councilors was held on August 20, 1962, the PRB won 54 seats out of 55. The sole non-PRB councilor joined the PRB one week later. Some 16 out of the 55 District Councilors in due course became members of the 33-member Legislative Council. The British colonial government, however, entirely ignored the mandate that had been given to the PRB. The PRB concluded that it had no alternative but to resort to armed struggle and an uprising took place on December 8, 1962. It was quickly crushed by the overwhelming strength of the British forces. The main leaders of the PRB were either detained or sought asylum in neighboring countries, especially in Indonesia (Zaini 1987) . The links between this uprising and the armed struggle in Sarawak have so far not been adequately analyzed.
In April or May 1962, half a year before the uprising, the PRB requested the SLL to secretly send a delegation to consult about the political situation in North Kalimantan, which consisted of Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah. The SLL representatives including Wen and Lui How Ming 10 met the PRB delegation at Canada Hill, near Miri. The PRB delegates claimed that they had no alternative but to take up arms because the British colonial government had denied them all legal ways and means of protest and because they had already disposed their men in Brunei. Wen and Lui insisted on deferring the uprising because the time was not yet ripe in Sarawak (interview with Wong Lieng Kui on August 26, 2001). One of the NKCP documents recollected later that the participants of the Brunei uprising were nationalists, petit bourgeois, and intellectuals; the document further claimed that the uprising lacked the leadership of a proletarian political party (Anonymous 1988, p. 2) . Nonetheless, the PRB could not be persuaded. Soon after they returned to Kuching, in June and July 1962, all of the delegation members were arrested. Wen, Bong, and their wives were repatriated to China on their own application (letter from Wong). When the PRB rebellion took place on December 8, 1962, the SLL had to hurriedly prepare for armed struggle without weapons, military training, logistics, funds, and senior leaders. They hoped to be trained in the West Kalimantan region of Indonesia. Yap Choon Hau, Yang Chu Chung, Bong Kee Siaw, and Lay Choon alias Lin Guang Min went into hiding in West Kalimantan during January and February 1963, and Lam Wah Kwai in May 1963 . In that year, both Wen and Bong Kee Chok, who had been deported to China, also secretly entered West Kalimantan (Chua 2000, p. 46 ). It was not earlier than May 1963, however, that the first batch of ten youths was admitted to West Kalimantan for training. In July 1963, more than one hundred youths received military training in the rightist North Kalimantan National Army (NKNA) led by General Ahmad Yani (NKNLP 1983, pp. 9-10; Anonymous 1988, p. 3) .
At the end of 1963, Wen, Bong Kee Chok, Yang Chu Chung, Bong Kee Siaw, and six other SLL leaders were invited to Jakarta by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received military training there until their return to Gunung Asuansang in March 1964 (Chua 2000, p. 49) . By the end of 1965, 500 Sarawakians had been trained in West Kalimantan (NKNLP 1983, p. 10) . China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) provided weapons by way of Indonesia. But Indonesia appropriated these for their own use and instead gave the Sarawakian communists their own worn-out weapons (interview with Wong Lieng Kui on August 27, 2001). Though it seems that no PRB personnel received training in Indonesian territories alongside the Sarawak youths, in the political sphere their cooperation continued. The SLL leaders met Azahari, president of the PRB, in West Kalimantan at the end of 1963 to organize a united front. In early 1965, Yap Choon Hau and Lay Choon were invited to Jakarta by Azahari and participated in his North Kalimantan revolutionary government in exile (Tian 1990, pp. 111-12) . Wen, 11 Yap, and Lay assumed positions as internal affairs secretary, publicity secretary, and financial secretary respectively. Wen, Yap, Yang Chu Chung, Bong Kee Siaw, and Lay all participated in the first conference of the North Kalimantan People's Revolutionary Consultative Committee, held in Jakarta March [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] 1965 and presided over by Azahari. Since a few Indonesian government leaders including the Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, attended on the first day, it seems likely that the Indonesian government arranged this conference. The objectives of the conference were clarified by the revolutionary government leaders including Azahari so as to show the world a manifestation of opposition to "Malaysia" and the identity of a nation firmly united under the one banner of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan [sic] . The declaration adopted by the conference expressed the highest appreciation and gratitude for the sympathy, assistance, and support of the people and the government of Indonesia under the leadership of President Sukarno. This conference resolved, albeit in vain, to found the North Kalimantan National Liberation Front (NKNLF) (Renmin ribao, March 21, 1965; Chua 2000, p. 50; Zaini 1987, pp. 252-62) .
12 11 Wen appears in Zaini (1987, pp. 252, 261) under the pseudonym of internal affairs secretary, Yong Ah Bun. 12 "North Kalimantan" is used here instead of "Northern Borneo." Armed struggle of the NKNA in Sarawak. Eight thousand people forcibly resettled in Sarawak. Sept. 4, 1965 Citizens of Kuching support the North Kalimantan revolutionary government. Oct. 1, 1965 Delegation of North Kalimantan, headed by Ariff Mohd., visits China to attend the national day celebration. Jan. 18, 1966 The Third Asia, Africa, Latin American Solidarity Conference held. Some 82 countries, including North Kalimantan, participate.
a Odd though it may seem, Lay Choon's surname written with Chinese characters in this report is different from the versions of it that appeared in Tian Nong's (1990) book.
When the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference was celebrated in Jakarta in April 1965, the North Kalimantan delegation headed by Azahari took part. The revolutionary government's delegation headed by Lay Choon visited Ghana and China in 1965 (Tian 1990, pp. 111-12) . Their concerted, cooperative activities were, however, ineffective and short-lived (see Table III ). The NKCP had no option but to remain as a party that was based only in Sarawak. Because of the September 30 Incident of 1965, they could not continue staying in Jakarta. Lay Choon went back to West Kalimantan in August 1966. He was captured by the Indonesian army in September 1968 . In a statement dated July 20, 1969, Lay "admitted" his subversive activities (Tian 1990, pp. 109-16) . After being released, he became a secretary of the Sarawak Chief Minister and then joined the Democratic Action Party (information provided by Mr. Choo Mun Hua, a historian of Sibu, on August 28, 2001).
III. FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NKCP
A white paper of the Malaysian government published in 1972 stated that the formation of the communist party had been mooted in 1965 at a secret meeting in Pontianak of representatives of the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO) and the PKI, and that the NKCP was inaugurated on March 30, 1970 (Malaysia 1972, p. 26) . On the other hand, an authentic Chinese dictionary states that the Party was founded on July 19, 1971 (Zhou 1993, p. 175 Mahmud [2000, pp. 257-58]) According to the Party's own document, at the higher ranking cadres' conference, which was held in Pontianak on September 19, 1965 and attended by 11 senior leaders including Wen, Lam Wah Kwai, Bong Kee Chok, Yang Chu Chung, Yap Choon Hau, and Bong Kee Siaw, it was decided to form the communist party. They believed that a protracted revolutionary armed struggle had by then given them sufficient training to form a communist party. Thus September 19 became a historical date for them as the starting point for the Party's formation (NKNLP 1983, pp. 11-12) . Chua Chung Toi states that this conference resolved that the Party's name should be the North Kalimantan Communist Party and nominated a preparatory committee consisting of Wen, Lam, and Bong Kee Chok to make the Party a reality. Soon after the conference, Wen left for China. On September 19, 1971 Bong, as Secretary of the Party's second bureau, formally declared the foundation of the NKCP (Chua 2000, pp. 51-53, 66) . According to Wong Lieng Kui, the date of September 19, 1971 was chosen through communication among the top leaders and was assented to also by Wen. Guerrilla members celebrated the day in the jungle. Congratulatory messages were sent from the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Malaya (interview with Wong on August 26, 2001). However, Ang Chu Ting is reported recently to have testified that the NKCP was founded six years earlier, on September 19, 1965 (Nanyang siang pau, February 10, 2003 . Is this a retrospective revision of history? The situation seems complicated. The statement of the NKCP Central Committee dated September 19, 1974 clarifies matters. 13 The statement is as follows: 1. The SLL held its Enlarged Central Plenum Conference on September 17, 1965 and decided to dissolve itself and to form the NKCP under the auspices of Wen Ming Chyuan; 2. Due to the environment of our war, it was not before September 19, 1971 that the Party's Central Committee officially declared the formation of the NKCP; and 3. Presently (in other words on September 19, 1974 ) the Central Committee decided that the Party had officially been formed on September 19, 1965 on the grounds that;
(1) The conference of 1965 reflected the revolutionary will of the North Kalimantan's proletariat and inevitable development of their struggle, (2) Some leaders who had attended that conference and contributed to construct the Party heroically died prior to 1971, and (3) We have to eliminate a bad influence brought about by surrender of the right wing opportunists of March 4, 1974. The assumption of power by the military in Indonesia, a development that resulted from the September 30 Incident, totally changed the position of the North Kalimantan communists. Instead of receiving various forms of support and training, they now found themselves faced with hostility and suppression. As a result of deteriorating conditions, conflict among the leaders came to the surface. Yap Choon Hau and Yang Chu Chung insisted on a large-scale people's war (Tian 1990, p. 64) or armed struggle against the Indonesian army (interview with Wong), and for doing so were later criticized as left adventurists and factionalists (Anonymous 1988, p. 5) . When Lam Wah Kwai decided not to go to the eastern territory that had been assigned to him by the Party, and remained instead in the western territory where Yap and Yang were stationed, conflict between him and the Yap-Yang group became irreversible. Yap and Yang, who were inferior to Lam in the Party ranking, had to obey Lam. The Third Platoon led by Yap and Yang, which was the largest corps of the SPGF, thus decisively broke away from the leading faction of the Party. The situation that led to elimination of the Third Platoon was as follows. Nevertheless, the mainstay of the SPGF was thus eliminated. It should be noted that when I interviewed him, Wong did not criticize Yap and Yang. On the contrary, he praised them for having fought bravely to the end. The passage of a few decades of time seems to have made the interpretation of history more objective and impartial.
From 1966 the communists gradually returned from West Kalimantan in Indonesia to Sarawak. The Party document characterizes the period as: (1) struggle in Indonesia , and (2) small rise of armed struggle inside "our country" 16 . As it took some time for the influence of the September 30 coup to totally change the situation in Kalimantan, the activities of the communists inside Indonesia reached a peak in 1968. Prior to the September 30 coup, they were militarily trained by the Indonesian army. After the coup, while evading and struggling against increasing oppression by the Indonesian authorities who turned out to be hostile towards them, they tried to establish bases there. Despite this, however, all the forces had shifted back to Sarawak by 1972. In 1971 the number of the armed guerrilla members inside the country (Sarawak) reached its highest point, with more than nine hundred members (Anonymous 1988, pp. 6-17 Luo et al. (2003, p. 21) give it as Songkung. 15 See Table I . Huoyan Shan (mountain of blaze) is an area surrounding Sangauled where the troop was formed. As it was a cold mountainous place, they adopted this name to give themselves high morale (Luo 2003, pp. 3-4) . 16 "Our country" refers to the region of Sarawak.
1973. The main troops led by Bong began to emerge from the jungle in October and were followed by Lam's troops who came out in March 1974 (Chua 2000, pp. 191-225) . By July 4, 1974 or in other words by the end of the Operasi Sri Aman (the amnesty period set by the state government on signing the agreement), 570 guerrillas had accepted the amnesty and had come out. Only 185 remained in the jungle (Chua 2000, pp. 110-11) .
At the Second September 19 Conference convened in 1977 (the First September 19 Conference was convened in 1965), the communists regarded the dismantlement of their bases in West Kalimantan and the overconcentration of their efforts in the Chinese residential areas in Sarawak as a mistake. Two tendencies were criticized: the rightist opportunism of sparsely deploying the troops in the residential areas (a strategy which reflected an inability to understand the importance of the jungle bases) and the leftist extremism of overexposing their personnel to the public by too frequently engaging in battles close to residential areas (Anonymous 1988, pp. 6, 11, 46) . It was decided to restore bases in the Indonesian territories on the other side of the border. The return to West Kalimantan began in early 1978 (Anonymous 1988, pp. 6-7, 26) . But severe mopping-up operations by the Indonesian Army as well as Malaysian-Indonesian joint military operations awaited them. Beginning their return to Sarawak in the early 1980s, the guerrillas completed their withdrawal on December 26, 1985. It was decided in 1982 to intrude into the Northeast Divisions of Sarawak as well as Brunei and Sabah. The communists attached greater importance to activities for obtaining the support and participation of the indigenous peoples (Anonymous 1988, pp. 31-39) . 17 However, the government's suppression surpassed every effort that the communists could make, and a peace agreement was signed on October 17, 1990. The agreement laid down the following terms:
As of today, the Second Bureau of the North Kalimantan Communist Party (meaning virtually whole party organization remaining at that time) will be dissolved and members of all the armed units will withdraw from the jungle. They pledge loyalty to King and Country and respect the Constitutions and laws of Malaysia and the State of Sarawak. . . . They will enjoy all rights of lawful citizens and participate freely in political activities within the ambit of the Federal and State constitutions. (Porritt 2004, p. 279) In fact, it seems that ever since then, the government has not allowed the communists to engage in political activities on an individual basis, let alone as an organiza-17 Among 31 Northeast Assault Unit members of the NKPA who came out of the jungle following the peace agreement of 1990, one was an Iban, six were Penan, and the others were Chinese. An Iban, namely Ubong, was appointed deputy commander of the NKPA in 1977. He and a Penan, namely Uva Juga, participated in the signing of the agreement together with five Chinese leaders including Ang (Chua 2000, pp. 113, 132-35, 182) . Though the Chinese share of the total Sarawak population was less than one-third (29 percent in 1970), a large majority of the communist guerrillas as well as of the NKCP were Chinese.
tion. Constrained by these circumstances, by means of publishing memoirs the communists try to reassess the history that has so far been written one-sidedly from the government point of view. This situation is almost same as that of the MCP after the peace agreement of 1989. Prior to the agreement of 1990, the last remnant of the guerrillas-a detachment of 52 persons-came out of the jungle on October 2 (Chua 2000, pp. 133-35 ; letter from Wong). According to the communists' statistics, the casualties on both sides between 1965 and 1973 were as follows: 
IV. ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN, WEN MING CHYUAN
Wen Ming Chyuan was born into a peasant family in Kuching in 1932. His ancestors were Hakka from Hui Yang in Guangdong Province (Nandao Series Editorial Committee 2000, pp. 335-36). When studying at Kuching Chung Hua Middle School, he was already a leading member of the SLL. He later left Chung Hua Middle School. Though he was one of the founder members of the SUPP, his name was not made public at its foundation because of the need to act cautiously under the suppressive control of the colonial government (Tian 1990, pp. 66-68) . In the second term , he was a member of the central standing committee of the SUPP and its education-propaganda secretary. For the duration of the third term , he was again a member. On June 22, 1962 he was arrested, together with two other standing committee members, Bong Kee Chok and Chin Shao Thong (otherwise known as Chen Shao Tang, born in China). Both Wen and Bong abandoned their Sarawakian citizenship and demanded to be deported to China. Wen, Bong, their wives, who were also SUPP members, and Chin, who was a Chinese citizen, were deported to China on June 27, 1962 (Deng 1989, pp. 150-51, 554-55) . In early 1965, Wen and Bong came back to Sarawak and went into hiding in Indonesian territory. Shortly before September 30, 1965 Wen left West Kalimantan for China (Tian 1990, pp. 62, 66) .
As was pointed out earlier, Wen continued to play a decisive role since the emergence of communism in Sarawak after the end of World War II. It is not known how he came into West Kalimantan from China in early 1965, but without appropriate arrangements by both the Chinese and the Indonesian governments, his arrival would have been impossible. After presiding at the historic Central Plenum Congress of the SLL, at which the foundation of the NKCP was decided, he left for China at the end of September 1965. It was not until June 21, 1966 that his presence in China was reported by the Renmin ribao. Thereafter his name occasionally appeared in the newspaper until March 24, 1978 (see Table IV ). The last of such reports, concerning a congratulatory message sent to the Fifth Chinese National People's Congress, was in the newspaper's March 24, 1978 edition. His name has not appeared since then in China. After that, the Voice of Malayan Revolution on two occasions conveyed statements of his in his capacity as Chairman of the NKCP. The first of these, broadcast on July 22, 1978 was dated June 25, 1978. It was a congratulatory message sent to the MCP on the 30th anniversary of its liberation war. Wen stressed the close relations between the two parties that had been continuing an armed struggle against their common enemy, the Malaysian government. He stated that their struggle in North Kalimantan had a history of 15 years. This implies that the PRB's uprising towards the end of 1962 marked the start of their armed struggle.
The second statement, broadcast on May 1, 1980 was a congratulatory message sent to the MCP on April 30 celebrating the 50th anniversary of its foundation. While reiterating his Party's determination to continue the revolutionary armed struggle, at the same time he pointed out that if the hegemonist cliques (meaning the then Soviet Union and Vietnam) should dare to invade Southeast Asian countries, the NKCP would stand alongside the peoples of Southeast Asia. This is the last news reported about Wen Ming Chyuan. When the final peace agreement was signed between the NKCP and the Sarawak state government on October 17, 1990 it was Ang Chu Ting, and not Wen, who signed on behalf of the party. 20 Nevertheless, it was Wen Ming Chyuan's proposal in 1980, in accordance with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s foreign policy, to change the main enemy from the Malaysian government to the international hegemonists, that paved the way for the signing of the treaty a decade later.
It is well known that Wen criticized the peace agreement of 1973 in his statement dated March 9, 1974. When the agreement was signed, more radical leaders headed by Ang met in the jungle quarters of the Third Division and decided to take advantage of this agreement to put into action legal activities on the one hand and to continue the armed struggle on the other. They devised a policy of chuduo liushao (majority goes out, minority remains). Persuaded by Bong Kee Chok, Ang also came out of the jungle to negotiate with the state government. While Ang asserted that the Memorandum of Understanding be announced first to guarantee their legal activities, the state government demanded that all the guerrillas should come out before any announcement be made. As a compromise, a "gentleman's agreement" with the state government was signed on January 10, 1974. Until the end, the NKCP never admitted how many of its members remained in the jungle (Anonymous 1988, pp. 18-19) . Nevertheless, this policy was criticized two years later as rightist opportunism, revisionism, and surrenderism (Anonymous 1988, p. 20) . On August 22, 1976 the Party called upon those who had left the jungle to return, but only a few responded (Anonymous 1988, p. 20 20, 1974) One might assume that this statement persuaded Ang and his group to change their minds about continuing with the armed struggle. Wong states, however, that they had decided to continue the struggle prior to Wen's statement (letter from Wong). On the other hand, according to a Party source, before signing the agreement, Bong Kee Chok received a letter from Wen calling for the simultaneous deployment of both lawful activities and armed struggles. Perceiving this as an approval of stopping the armed struggle, Bong continued with the peace negotiations (an anonymous Party source). When we read carefully Wen's statement given above, the last part might indeed be interpreted in the way that Bong perceived. Whatever the case, this shows that although staying abroad, Wen still remained quite influential.
The same Party source also shows that it was Wen who initiated the final peace negotiations of 1990. Six days after the signing of the peace agreement between the MCP and the Malaysian government (the agreement was signed at Had Yai, South Thailand), the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Malaysia announced that, in pursuit of the cease-fire, Wen's representative had contacted the Malaysian delegation in Had Yai on December 8, 1989 (Chua 2000, pp. 126-27 ; Biannian shi provided by Wong Lieng Kui). Prior to this, Wen did not consult, or even inform the leaders who remained in Sarawak. Through a third party, the state government proposed the cease-fire to the NKCP leaders. After discussing the matter among themselves for a few months, the Party accepted the proposal. While the negotiations were going on, senior local leaders sought Wen's instructions. Through the third party, Wen's letters dated May 14, and June 28, 1990, arrived from China. In the first letter Wen entrusted the cease-fire to Ang and Wong Lieng Kui and advised following the MCP's example concerning the members' welfare after coming out of the jungle. In the second letter, Wen expressed his appreciation of the efforts of Ang and Wong to reach a settlement (Chua 2000, pp. C6-C7, 127-30) . With Wen's official approval and the members' consent reached through repeated discussions in the jungle, the NKCP finally decided to bring their protracted armed struggle to an end.
It can be assumed that most of the leaders of the Southeast Asian countries' illegal communist parties who stayed in China still stuck to the armed struggle line in 1974. The CCP also still continued, though half-heartedly compared with its stance in the late 1960s and the earlier 1970s, to support the armed struggle in Southeast Asia at that time. By 1990, however, most Southeast Asian communist parties, including the MCP, had abandoned armed struggle. Prior to this, China had suspended the provision of material as well as moral support to the various parties concerned. That might be the reason why Wen opposed the peace agreement in 1974 yet contrariwise acceded to and even proposed it in 1990.
In 1983 the NKCP lamented that it had lost Wen's leadership twice and therefore no leading center had been formed inside North Kalimantan. A concrete example of developments there is that in 1966, soon after Wen left West Kalimantan, the SPGF split into the Lam-Bong faction and the Yap-Yang faction. Another example is Wen's criticism (dated March 9, 1974) of Bong's peace agreement, an intervention that had a tremendous influence on their comrades. His incessant instructions given in radio broadcasts 21 led their comrades to realize that the chuduo liushao policy was wrong (NKNLP 1983, pp. 15, 17, 21) . Another Party document of 1988 pointed out that the Party lacked a united leadership and that they needed one central leader (Anonymous 1988, pp. 22, 46) . These documents, moreover, show how Wen was respected by Party members even though he remained in China.
Wen, who has already left China, is reportedly living in France or Poland (an anonymous Party source). It is not known whether he left on his own accord or whether the Chinese government asked him to go. His wife, Wong Fuk Ing, was teaching the Malay language at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, Beijing University, in the 1990s (Chua 2000, p. 128) .
V. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NKCP AND CHINA
Various studies of Sarawak have referred to the inclination toward China of the local Chinese residents in the early postwar years. They regarded China as their homeland and were not interested in local political affairs (Chin 1997, pp. 39-45; Poulgrain 1998, pp. 77, 103; Chua 2000, pp. 11, 13, 155) . Communist documents admit this also.
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In due course, however, the dissolution of the POCYS, the return to China of the main leaders of the SNDYL, the subsequent dissolution of the SNDYL, and then the establishment of the SLL were all symptomatic of the emergence and consolidation of an identification mainly with their home territories, namely Sarawak and North Kalimantan (NKNLP 1983, pp. 1-3) . Notwithstanding this distinct reorientation of identity consciousness among the Sarawakian Chinese from China to North Kalimantan (Sarawak), respect of the ethnic Chinese communists towards China seemed to continue for some time. It reminds us of position of the MCP. The MCP also consisted mostly of ethnic Chinese and its top leaders continued paying respect specifically towards China until the end. The Chinese government, for its part, was determined to support all revolutionary struggles all over the world, those of the Southeast Asian countries included. Tables III and V show the enthusiasm, at least in moral terms, with which China supported the armed struggle of the North Kalimantan people from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. As mentioned above, it is said that China attempted to provide weapons to the North Kalimantan communists via Indonesia during the Sukarno era. From September 1965 onwards, the supreme leader of the NKCP, Wen Ming Chyuan, was continuously resident in China. The Renmin ribao's occasional reports about him during this period also reflect China's support of the revolutionary movement of the NKCP.
The perception of China as a center of world revolution meant that the NKCP members became closely attached to China. Guerrillas in the jungle habitually listened to Radio Peking as well as to the Voice of Malayan Revolution and they studied Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong's works every morning (Anonymous 1978, p. 1; author's emphasis). According to a Party document, after the Cultural Revolution began in China in the mid-1960s, the influence of China's political development strengthened further and there was an intensification of education according to Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought. The Kalimantan communists were inclined to immediately learn and apply new Chinese tendencies (NKNLP 1983, pp. 19-20) . Another document of 1988 expresses regret that the application of MarxismLeninism and Mao's thought to the concrete conditions of North Kalimantan was (Anonymous 1988, pp. 3, 22) . This seems to imply that once the North Kalimantan communists had made their long march deep into Sarawak, their original bases in the West KalimantanSarawak border areas were not to be maintained. As such, it seems also to imply that they should not have automatically adopted the Long March strategy implemented by Mao and instead should have kept their bases in the border areas. The above-mentioned document of 1983 criticized the former dogmatism of the communists in adopting Mao's "base theory" to North Kalimantan without adjustment (NKNLP 1983, p. 24) .
As to why their forces have declined since the early 1970s, the communists themselves list the following external reasons:
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(1) Lack of international material support (Anonymous 1988, p. 17) ; (2) (In the early 1970s) Compromise between China and the United States, the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Malaysia, and possible détente in Southeast Asia gave rise to opportunism and revisionism amongst the revolutionary forces (Anonymous 1988, p. 22) ; (3) (In the 1980s) Belief in communism was diluted. Capitalism seems to have been thought superior to socialism (Anonymous 1988, p. 40) ; and (4) Revolutionary armed struggles in Southeast Asia are slack. Even moral support from outside is restricted and slight (Anonymous 1988, p. 40) . One of the conclusions of this document is that the protracted weakening of the struggle was mainly due to unfavorable objective circumstances and not to the subjective errors of their own leadership (Anonymous 1988, p. 44 ). This conclusion seems to imply that reduced support from China gradually made armed struggle difficult. As has already been mentioned, Wen, who had been staying in China ever since late 1965, initiated the cease-fire negotiations. Prior to this, he must have consulted about this matter not only with the MCP leaders, who had signed the peace agreement at the end of 1989, but also with the CCP. Chinese foreign policy, or more precisely change of policy, seems to have exerted a decisive influence upon the vicissitudes of the NKCP.
